“During the course of a hot and humid stretch in the middle of summer on the East Coast of Canada, while hearing about record heat waves and wild fires, I find myself reflecting on over 20 years of efforts in Canada to respond appropriately to the challenge of climate change. During the past 20 years, Canada has gone from leader to laggard twice, once with the Kyoto Protocol, and again, it would appear based on recent developments, with the implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement.”
Dr. Meinhard Doelle, Professor of Law, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University
Dr. Meinhard Doelle, Professor of Law, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, has graciously agreed to join the CEGE Connection conversation and share his insights on climate change and environment law. We highly recommend a visit to Professor Doelle’s Blog: Environment Law News, which provides vital information that speaks to the complexities of environmental and energy law, climate change, GHG emissions, and the role of human rights in these areas of enquiry.
“Decades of Climate Policy Failure in Canada: Can we Break The Vicious Cycle?” has been republished from Professor Doelle’s blog, Environment Law News.
During the course of a hot and humid stretch in the middle of summer on the East Coast of Canada, while hearing about record heat waves and wild fires, I find myself reflecting on over 20 years of efforts in Canada to respond appropriately to the challenge of climate change. During the past 20 years, Canada has gone from leader to laggard twice, once with the Kyoto Protocol, and again, it would appear based on recent developments, with the implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement. All this, of course, after Canada had already committed to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels by 2000 in the context of the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change, a commitment it also failed to implement.
Canada eventually withdrew its ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and in the process did very little to reduce domestic emissions compared to most developed and even some developing countries.
Following its leadership role in 1997 in the Kyoto negotiations, Canada’s federal government of the day worked hard with provinces and stakeholders to develop a set of climate policies to implement effective climate mitigation and adaptation in Canada. It ratified the Kyoto Protocol, supported its entry into force, but efforts to take effective steps to implement Canada’s commitments ultimately failed. Canada eventually withdrew its ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and in the process did very little to reduce domestic emissions compared to most developed and even some developing countries. Some provinces, such as British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec and Nova Scotia, stepped up to lead during this period of federal withdrawal, but Canada as a whole never achieved any leadership in its domestic mitigation efforts.
Canada has more recently made another effort at climate mitigation leadership, this time in the context of the Paris Climate Agreement in December 2015, only to falter yet again in translating its international leadership into effective domestic implementation. In this post, I will share my reflections on this most recent cycle, which started with the election of the Trudeau Liberal Government in the fall of 2015.
The Liberal Party under Justin Trudeau showed signs of leadership on climate change during the 2015 federal election. It beat out the NDP in part by appealing to traditional NDP and Green Party voters on issues such as climate change. Once elected, it continued to show leadership during the UN climate negotiations, by playing an important, constructive role in the final days of the Paris climate negotiations in December 2015. It was part of an ‘ambition coalition’ of over 100 countries that secured the inclusion of the global goals of keeping temperature increases to well below 2 degrees while striving for 1.5, and to aim to reach global carbon neutrality by the second half of the century. Canada continued to show leadership by ratifying the Paris Agreement quickly to help bring it into force in record time by November 2016.
In spite of agreeing to provisions in the Paris Agreement that recognize the gap between individual commitments and the collective goals and call for an increase of effort over time to meet the collective goals, Canada continues to show no willingness to increase its commitment by revising its NDC.
As the Trudeau government turned its attention to domestic implementation, the failure to turn international leadership into domestic action soon began to show. The first step was not encouraging. In spite of its criticism of the Harper government on its inadequate efforts on climate change, and in spite of its commitment to the Paris Climate Agreement, the Trudeau government did not increase the ambition of Canada’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) from the inadequate NDC the previous government had filed before the Paris Agreement was finalized. In spite of agreeing to provisions in the Paris Agreement that recognize the gap between individual commitments and the collective goals and call for an increase of effort over time to meet the collective goals, Canada continues to show no willingness to increase its commitment by revising its NDC.
The second step of the Trudeau government was more encouraging. It was able to negotiate a Pan Canadian Framework on Climate Change with most of the provinces and all territories.[1] The agreement was disappointing to some in that it did not bring all provinces on board, and its commitment would not get Canada all the way to its 2020 or 2030 emission reduction targets under the inadequate NDC filed by the Harper government. Nevertheless, it had the potential to be an important breakthrough in overcoming the past divisions over effective climate mitigation in Canada, and to put Canada on the path to decarbonization.
There is no credible evidence that Canada, as a whole, will benefit from resisting this transition. There are strong indications to the contrary even in the short to medium term, and the combination of the cost of inaction and the economic opportunities associated with action leaves little doubt about the net economic benefits of decarbonization in the long term.[2]
Perhaps the biggest flaw of this effort was the federal government’s failure to clearly position the Pan Canadian Framework, from the start, as an initial step that needed to be strengthened over time. Instead, it has become an inadequate high-water mark to be attacked and whittled down by powerholders who oppose to the decarbonization of Canadian society out of near-sighted self-interest and political opportunism. It is clear that the opposition to the transition comes from those who benefit from the status quo. There is no credible evidence that Canada, as a whole, will benefit from resisting this transition. There are strong indications to the contrary even in the short to medium term, and the combination of the cost of inaction and the economic opportunities associated with action leaves little doubt about the net economic benefits of decarbonization in the long term.[2]
Since it negotiated the Pan Canadian Framework, rather than fully implement it and prepare for the next level of effort, the Trudeau government has taken major steps backward in response to relentless pressure from some provinces and industry sectors. Such steps include the following:
Developing backstop legislation for a key element of the Pan Canadian Framework, the carbon pricing element, that abandons the spirit of the framework by exempting 70 percent of emissions for some industry sectors from the carbon price. This essentially means that most emissions from these sectors are actually not subject to a carbon price at all.[3] Announcing that exemption to some industries will be increased to 80 and 90 percent, further eroding the carbon pricing element of the framework, meaning that even more emissions from these sectors are not subject to a carbon price. Assuming modest efforts to reduce emissions, these sectors may now be exempt from the carbon price all together, without a clear signal that the remainder will be priced in the future.[4] [Read more…]