Failing states: Continuing instability in Myanmar and Afghanistan

Over the past several months the notion of “failed states” has gained renewed currency.

Scenes of an unruly mob breaking its way into the US Capitol buildings on January 6 led to semi-hysterical comment about “the death of US democracy.”

A February 1 military coup in Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, ended what was hoped to be at least the beginnings of a transition to real democracy. Having suffered under often brutal military rule for much of the past five decades, the hopes of the Myanmar people have again been quashed under military boots; over the past three months more than 750 civilian protestors have been killed by the Tatmadaw, the country’s military. Aung San Suu Kyi, whose party swept national elections in November 2020, is again being held under house arrest.

And in Afghanistan, a country that similarly has been without peace for generations, President Biden’s recent decision to remove all remaining US military personnel from the country by September 11 has provoked fears of either a return to Taliban rule or an anarchic spiral into yet another cycle of ethnic and warlord-based civil conflict. Hope has always been a somewhat scare commodity in Afghanistan; today it is increasingly difficult to find grounds for optimism.

As a political scientist I am interested in determining the factors that lead or drive countries to become failed states. But in the cases of both Afghanistan and Myanmar, tracking the deteriorating prospects for a better future is personal.

I lived and worked in Afghanistan for more than seven years, first in connection with a series of joint United Nations, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank “needs assessment missions” hastily launched after the post-9/11 ouster of the Taliban regime; later as part of the Asian Development Bank’s resident mission in Afghanistan; and subsequently as a technical advisor with Tawanmandi, a multi-donor-funded civil society strengthening project.

In Myanmar, I spent a year as a Cuso International volunteer with Open Myanmar Initiative, a local democracy and governance NGO established by a group of former political prisoners during what now can be seen as only a brief respite from military rule.

What is happening today in these two countries tears at my heart. I spend far too much time in front of my computer screen following news bulletins, Twitter and Facebook postings, and pore through a veritable flood of comment and analysis, little of which portends anything good. In Afghanistan, former colleagues fear their daily commute to work, or their children’s walk to school, knowing that the next suicide bomb might instantly shred their lives. And in Myanmar, those protesting the military take-over similarly know that their lives could end with a shot to the head, or by torture in a police cell.

My study of comparative politics and international relations has given me the theoretical tools to dispassionately discuss the rankings of these countries on the “Fragile States Index” compiled by The Fund for Peace. But it is difficult to be dispassionate when the Halifax noon day gun frequently transports me back to the echoing blast of a suicide bomb in Kabul, or when I view in real time the anti-coup demonstrations in front of the wet market in Yangon where I used to buy my food.

What is so dispiriting is that both these countries have known nothing but instability for decades. Indeed, Myanmar is home to one of the world’s longest-running civil wars. Already fractured at the time of its independence in 1948, there has been ongoing conflict between the Tatmadaw and a collection of armed ethnic minority groups. These groups are mostly concentrated in the country’s border regions, and have long been demanding a greater stake in the country’s future, including a more equitable share of its resources. Efforts towards some kind of durable federation have consistently faltered. Myanmar, then, has failed as a peaceable state, and the recent reimposition of Tatmadaw control has derailed prospects of both civilian rule and some kind of new political accommodation. After months of civilian – and mostly youth-led – protests, the country is now threatened with economic collapse. Much of Myanmar’s population faces severe hardship, including growing food insecurity. In 2021, Myanmar’s descent on the negative ranking of the Failed States Index is assured.

Afghanistan, too, affords little hope of a more peaceful future. Over the past decade there have been well over 100,000 civilian casualties. On April 25 the Afghan Ministry of Interior blamed the Taliban for 62 improvised explosive device (IED) attacks as well as six suicide bombings launched over just the previous 10 days; these attacks killed 63 civilians and wounded another 160. A recent United Nations report indicated that 573 Afghan civilians had been killed and 1,210 wounded during the first three months of 2021, a 21% increase over the same period the previous year. Although the Taliban and the Afghan government have met over the past year to discuss an agenda for peace talks, prospects for an agreement that might see the establishment of a joint interim government pending national elections and the adoption of a new constitution seem highly unlikely. The full withdrawal of American and other foreign forces by September 11 could well result in the Taliban regaining control of the country. As of today, the Taliban has outright control of some 20 per cent of the country’s districts, with huge areas of the country under see-sawing control. The Taliban already has established shadow government administrations in many parts of the country. A confidential American security assessment has suggested that the country could fall to full Taliban control within two to three years. Already there is intense speculation as to the kind of rule a victorious Taliban might reimpose, particularly with respect to women’s rights, which has been among the few areas of real progress over the past two decades. Worse, the country’s long legacy of bloodshed and longstanding ethnic-based rivalries could see Afghanistan descend into another cycle of bloody intra-state conflict.

So – two countries, both failing or failed states.

Next up – how do we measure state failure? And what, if anything, can the international community do to prevent fragile states from becoming failed states?