
Note: This blog was prepared end-August 2021 and is certain to be superseded by further fast-changing events in Afghanistan.
In the two decades since the American-led ouster of the Taliban regime, events in Afghanistan have frequently dominated the news headlines.
President Biden’s April 2021 announcement that all American troops would withdraw from Afghanistan no later than September 11 resulted in a further spate of news coverage. In early August the country’s provincial capitals began to fall to Taliban control like so many dominos, followed by Kabul, the capital, on August 16. Since then, there has been extensive media coverage of the Taliban’s resurrection, including much arm-chair analysis as to “what went wrong” and speculation as to the nature of renewed Taliban rule. Given the movement’s brutal past, can it be trusted to deliver on its assurances that it will seek “inclusive governance” and that it will uphold women’s rights “in accordance with Sharia law”? There also has been extensive coverage of the hastily-organized air evacuation of some 113,500 foreign nationals and Afghans and their families who had worked with foreign forces or international organizations or who otherwise might be subject to Taliban retribution. Tens of thousands of Afghan citizens also have made their way to the country’s land borders, trying to escape what seems a doomed country. And, of course, there is the horrific coverage of the August 26 suicide bombing by the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISIS-K). The attack, targeting the mob of Afghans desperately trying to gain access to the Kabul airport and the dwindling number of evacuation flights, killed at least 175 Afghans as well as 13 American soldiers and maimed dozens, if not hundreds more innocent people, including children.
For someone who has lived and worked in Afghanistan, and who has deep affection for the country and its people, the events of the past several months, and particularly the last few weeks, is nothing short of gut-wrenching. My heart bleeds for a much-blighted country and its people, many of whom see the return of the Taliban as “the massacre of their dreams and aspirations”. Was 20 years of effort to build an effective state all for naught? Will the hard-won progress achieved across so many sectors be reversed?
The history of the internationally directed interregnum between the two Taliban regimes certainly will be dissected, parsed, and debated. Already, however, too much attention is being given to the familiar tropes of “the graveyard of empires,” the squandering of too much “blood and treasure,” and how the Taliban’s “you have the watch, we have the time” victory compares to America’s defeat in Viet Nam. Similarly, there has been a host of articles pontificating on how its failure in Afghanistan will impact the United States’ standing in the world, although at its height, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) included troops from 51 NATO and partner nations, with similar international participation in efforts to provide the country with much-needed nation-building and development assistance. International coverage of the Taliban’s return to power has focused on [American] imperial hubris and the ignominy of defeat. Too, there are the heartrending stories of those Afghans, many of them associated with “the American era,” and their desperate attempts to flee the country. One can anticipate that media attention will quickly turn to the stories of their resettlement abroad rather than to focus on the millions of Afghanistan’s citizens who again find themselves under Taliban rule.
In the immediate wake of the Taliban’s return to power, insufficient international attention is being directed to the longer-term welfare of the Afghan people. A month ago the international community pledged to “protect the gains” of 20 years of nation-building. A few weeks later, embassies were shuttered and diplomatic personnel evacuated. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan has been relatively silent, with the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General on August 17 indicating that United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations remain “committed to supporting vulnerable people in Afghanistan who need us more than ever.” The international community must have a strong presence in Afghanistan to engage with the Taliban, to offer support towards good governance, and to “bear witness” to any of the feared human rights or other abuses enacted by the Taliban. Instead, most of Afghanistan’s erstwhile partners have fled the country, and are busy freezing assets, planning sanctions, and considering whether to withhold desperately needed humanitarian and development assistance. Wielding sticks rather than engaging in dialogue and offering carrot-like incentives that might encourage moderated behaviour on the part of the returning Taliban threatens to again isolate a country of some 38 million people.
With the airlift ended by both the calendar and the August 26 suicide attacks outside the gates of the Kabul airport, attention must shift to the country’s war-weary population, which in addition to the uncertainty of a new political order, also is confronted by the ravages of an uncontained spread of COVID-19 and widespread hunger as the result of drought and crop failure. The World Bank has estimated that a further four million Afghans will fall into destitution in the next three months alone. With many embassies now closed or relocated outside the country, the role of the United Nations and remaining international and Afghan journalists and humanitarian actors will be essential, so as to highlight the plight of the Afghan population and the actions of the country’s returning Taliban rulers.
In the midst of my anguish over such a blighted country, I am struggling to understand what Afghanistan’s difficult trajectory tells us about failing or failed states. In 2001, after the years of Soviet occupation, protracted and bloody civil strife, and nearly three years of Taliban rule, Afghanistan was a failed state. Today, despite much progress over the past two decades, Afghanistan remains a failed state.
In particular, Afghanistan presents a telling example of the failure of the liberal peace model, the “government in a box” formula of democracy, free and fair elections, and institutional capacity building to give a new or struggling government broad-based legitimacy. The internationally-driven effort to rescue Afghanistan from failed state status itself failed to bring security to the country, or to successfully establish democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. From a failed states perspective, 20 years of effort – and the blood of a quarter of a million people – failed to establish the Western-backed government’s authority, legitimacy, and capacity. The inability of the former Afghan government to provide security and deliver services – the foundations of legitimacy and authority – seem to have paved the way for the Taliban’s return.
Today, it is all but impossible to predict Afghanistan’s future, including whether it will ever shed its failed state status. Will the new Taliban regime prove its legitimacy both domestically and internationally? Will it be able to effectively harness the country’s still limited human capacity (now exacerbated by the “brain drain” of many of the country’s best and brightest) towards human security, economic growth, and competent and non-corrupt governance? Or will the Taliban reinstate its strict interpretation of Sharia law, rendering the country and its people isolated, embargoed, and snared in an all-encompassing fragility trap marked by endemic poverty and human deprivation?
After so much blood and suffering, so much seemingly fruitless effort, and the not insignificant international support of the past 20 years, one can’t but hope (against hope) that the country and its people might finally see better days.
Photo by Sohaib Ghyasi on Unsplash