I have just returned from three days of workshops at Arizona State University in Phoenix on the Paris Climate Agreement. The workshop was conducted under the Chatham House Rule, so I will refrain from identifying individual participants who contributed to the rich discussion, but I do want to formally acknowledge how invaluable these workshops were in informing my thinking on the review process under the Paris Agreement. Special thanks to Dan Bodansky, Harro van Asselt, Ken Abbott and Tom Hale for organizing and leading the workshops.

One of the issues we explored in some detail was the operationalization of Articles 13-15 of the Paris Climate Agreement, a priority area for negotiators to resolve over the coming years to ensure the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement. The workshop involved about a dozen participants that included academics, climate negotiators, and members of non-governmental organizations working on climate policy. The following are some reflections on how the three-day discussions have informed my understanding of these review processes.

 

Articles 13, 14 and 15 of the Paris Agreement

By way of introduction, Article 13 provides for an enhanced transparency framework to ensure clarity on the actions taken by Parties and the support provided, needed and received. Specific areas of support identified are financial support, technology transfer and capacity building. A particular focus of Article 13 is the actions Parties take to achieve their nationally determined contribution (NDC). Key aspects of the Article 13 transparency framework will have to be negotiated before its implementation. Among them are rules on reporting, including the substance, timing, format, and methodologies of Party’s reports, and the flexibility to be afforded to some developing countries in terms of frequency and scope of the reporting obligation. A second element is a technical review to be carried out of the information provided by each Party under Article 13. Finally, Article 13 provides for a facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress on finance and on the implementation of NDCs.

Article 14 provides for a Global Stocktake of collective progress toward achieving the purpose of the Paris Agreement and its long-term goal. The stocktake shall include mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation and support, and shall consider equity and science in its assessment of progress. Sources of information include the IPCC and subsidiary bodies of the UNFCCC. The first Global Stocktake is to take place in 2023, though a less comprehensive assessment of progress is planned outside the Paris Agreement for 2018.

Article 15 calls for a mechanism to facilitate implementation of and promote compliance with the provisions of this Agreement. The committee to be established shall be expert based, facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive. The committee is to consist of 12 members with recognized competence in relevant scientific, technical, socio-economic or legal fields, to be elected by the Conference of the Parties. The regional distribution of membership of the committee is to follow the example of other committees under the UNFCCC, such as the compliance committee under the Kyoto Protocol.

 

Elements, Goals and Outcomes of the Reviews

My focus in this post is on the respective roles, connections, timing, sequencing and process options for the following elements of the review process set up in Articles 13-15:

1. The technical review of information provided by Parties on the implementation of and progress toward achieving their NDCs
2. The multilateral consideration of progress on the implementation of NDCs
3. The Global Stocktake of progress toward the LTG
4. The mechanism to facilitate implementation and to promote compliance

It is important to consider these elements of the review process under the Paris Agreement in light of the overall approach of the new climate regime negotiated in Paris, a combination of a collective top down long term goal, nationally determined short and medium term commitments, and a regular reporting, review and stocktaking process to encourage progression of ambition. Among the key considerations for the design of the review process are:

• The importance of Parties knowing whether other Parties are achieving or exceeding the goals set in their NDCs
• Recognition that while there is a commitment to progression in ambition from one NDC to the next in five year cycles, NDCs will continue to be nationally determined.
• There is no agreement on principles that would enable an objective assessment of the comparability of commitments
• The review and assessment of efforts is to be facilitative and non-punitive

Each element of the review process will undoubtedly have very specific goals and objectives, such as enhanced transparency. The ultimate goal of the overall review process, in my view, should be to motivate Parties to increase the ambition of their actions and support over time. It may be instructive, in light of this, to consider what outcomes of a review process have the potential motivate Parties to increase the ambition of their actions and support:

• Transparency of level of achievement, effort and barriers for each Party
• Knowing which Parties are achieving or exceeding their NDCs
• Getting recognition for genuine efforts to achieve or exceed NDCs
• Getting recognition for genuine efforts to increase ambition
• Getting help to overcome barriers to progress that challenge the capacity of the Party involved
• Learning how to overcome barriers
• Learning how to accelerate progress

One of the challenges in designing a review process for actions and support under the Paris Agreement is that it includes a range of efforts, each with its own unique legal status from legally binding to purely discretionary. The efforts that will be subject to review include mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity and reporting.

To further complicate matters, we should expect that the 197 Parties will, to varying degrees, fail to meet, meet or exceed elements of their NDCs for a broad range of reasons, such as inadvertence, lack of capacity, evolving views on fairness and comparability, unforeseen events, domestic political issues, economic factors, changes in our scientific understanding of the problem and solutions, changes in technologies, and changes in public support. In some cases, these factors will make compliance easier, in other cases they will create barriers. Some unexpected barriers will be overcome by Parties, others will not. Some efforts subject to review will be included in Parties’ NDCs, others will not, and the situation will differ from Party to Party. My basic point is that the review process can only hope to achieve the goal of contributing to increased ambition and meeting the long-term goal if it is designed with this diversity of circumstances in mind, and with a full appreciation of the complexity of the Paris Agreement.

 

Learning from the Past

Next I will briefly explore which review processes under the UNFCCC Parties might draw on for inspiration on how to design each of the four key elements of the review process under Articles 13-15.

 

For the Article 13 technical review, the expert review teams (ERTs) set up under the Kyoto Protocol to review compliance with key reporting and substantive obligations may offer lessons on how to design this element of the review process. The experts for these ERTs were nominated by Parties, selected by the COP, and served in teams of three. Among the concerns with the ERT process were inconsistencies in how experts treated certain issues, inconsistencies in which issues got referred to the compliance committee, a shortage of qualified experts, independence of experts from nominating Parties, and compensation of experts for their work.

The number of experts on a review team, training, compensation, the process for nomination of experts, and clear direction on the transition to other elements of the review are among the design issues that warrant consideration. In country reviews appears to be another issue that will be subject to further negotiation, as the Paris Agreement leaves this discretionary in spite of the demonstrated value of in country reviews for understanding the challenges and barriers and helping Parties overcome them.

The Article 13 multilateral review is perhaps the most difficult to design with reference back to a particular existing process. It is difficult to suggest which existing process may best serve as a starting point. The primary reason is that we know little about the purpose of this element of the review process and in particular how it is intended to relate to the expert review, the Global Stocktake, and the Article 15 mechanism. Possible processes to consider when designing the multilateral review include the international assessment and review (IAR), the international consultation and analysis (ICA), and the structured expert dialogue (SED) for the 2013-15 review of the long-term goal.

Depending on whether the multilateral review is seen as a step toward the Article 15 review, the Article 14 Global Stocktake, or potentially the conclusion of the review of the information provided by Parties under Article 13, the rigour of the process may be different. On balance, the SED would appear, at least on the surface, to be the most appropriate starting point for designing this element of the review. Among the issues to be explored further is the duration of the multilateral review, and whether it will deal with all Parties collectively, or with individual or groups of Parties.

For the Article 14 Global Stocktake, perhaps the most obvious process to draw on would be the structured expert dialogue (SED) for the 2013-15 review of the adequacy of the long-term goal. The SED process stretched over the course of two years and involved 5 separate sessions, covered two separate themes, involved 70 invited experts, and some 300 questions and answers between Parties and experts. While adjustments would likely have to be made, the basic concept of identifying appropriate themes for the Global Stocktake, inviting appropriate experts, and facilitating an open exchange between experts and Parties on the pre-determined themes would seem a promising start to the process.

A key question will be what the desired outcome of the Global Stocktake would be, and how to design the process to achieve the desired outcome. The SED did not include any formal conclusions or decisions, but it did include a number of messages from the co-facilitators of the process that sought to summarize points of convergence in the discussion. Further adjustments to the process may be warranted based on the experience with the 2018 stocktake to be carried out before the Paris Agreement becomes fully operational in 2020. Possible themes include how collective mitigation efforts measure up against the long-term goal, progress toward the global adaptation goal, the adequacy of support (finance, technology, capacity), and equity.

For the Article 15 implementation and compliance mechanism, the design and experience of the facilitative branch of the compliance committee under the Kyoto Protocol would seem to be most relevant. Certainly, the composition requirements are similar. The challenge with drawing on the facilitative branch of the Kyoto compliance system is that it was not very active, and it was unable to effectively deal with the one substantive case that was brought before it, a matter referred to it by South Africa on behalf of the G-77 with respect to the failure of a number of developed countries to file demonstrable progress reports. That experience suggests a danger that a committee with the composition prescribed for the Article 15 mechanism could run the risk of becoming politicized along developed developing country lines.

Differentiation will likely be a challenge in the design of this mechanism. A key design issue will be how the mechanism will deal with the different legal status of the various efforts that are subject to Article 13 reporting and review, and whether the Article 15 mechanism deals with all, only some issues identified in the Article 13 review, or will focus on issues not addressed under Article 13. Interesting in this regard is the reference to both implementation and compliance in Article 15, which might be interpreted as suggesting a broad range of issues to come before the committee.

The ultimate challenge with the Article 15 implementation and compliance mechanism is that it is difficult to design a process until there is more clarity on its role. Article 15 could focus on individual issues that arise out of the Article 13 technical review, it could pick up issues identified in the Article 13 multilateral review, or it could focus on issues potentially not at all covered by the Article 13 review, such as failure to file reports or submit NDCs all together. The Article 15 mechanism could also carry out thematic reviews of implementation and compliance, such as reporting and accounting methodologies. Finally, it could play a role in determining whether challenges Parties experience warrant priority access to assistance under the GCF, the CTCN, or capacity building. The key issue to keep in mind in considering an appropriate role is the composition of the Article 15 mechanism. It offers a middle ground between the COP and other open consultations on the one hand and expert reviews carried out by individuals or small teams of technical experts on the other.

 

Timing and Sequencing

The timing and sequencing of the key elements of the review cycles will be a complex and critical task in ensuring an effective review that effectively supports the goals of the Paris Agreement. The starting point for any of the review elements will be accurate and timely information. This means the reporting obligations need to be clarified, and compliance with the guidelines and methodologies developed needs to be promoted through early and regular reviews of the information provided. This needs to happen in advance of the start of the 5-year review cycles so that those cycles can proceed with the assurance that they are based on reliable, accurate and comparable information.

Some of the sequencing of the review cycles is already set. The first stocktake will take place in 2018. This will be followed by Parties submitting intended NDCs in 2019, and final NDCs in 2020. These elements of the review cycle then repeat themselves every five years, with the Global Stocktake in 2023, the filing of the next intended NDCs due in 2024, and the final NDCs due in 2025.

Key timing and sequencing issues that are unresolved are the commencement of the Parties’ reports under Article 13, the technical reviews of those reports, and the multilateral consideration. It seems clear that Article 13 envisages that the results of the Article 13 review will inform the Global Stocktake, though Article 14 is not as clear on this point. One approach would be to have annual reports filed by Parties, with some form of annual technical review, with flexibility on the frequency for Parties with demonstrated capacity challenges (until those challenges are resolved through the transparency capacity efforts provided for).

An advantage of annual reporting would be that it would be easier to pick appropriate years for more in-depth reviews in line with the overall 5 year review cycles, as the reports would be available each year. One set of in depth reviews would take place in the early years of the reporting for the specific purpose of ensuring accuracy, reliability and comparability of the information provided. After that, more in depth reviews could be timed to for the best fit with the elements of the review cycle already set, the Global Stocktake, the intended NDC, and the final NDC. A reasonable approach would be to aim to complete in depth reviews (both the technical and multilateral reviews under Article 13) before the start of the Global Stocktake, so that the Global Stocktake has the benefit of the Party reports as well as the results of the reviews. If the implementation and compliance mechanism serves a trouble shooting function, it will presumably have to fulfil that function as issues arise. To the extent that it also deals with thematic issues, those might also best be coordinated to ensure the results are available for the element they are most relevant for.

One further point on sequencing and timing. All elements of the review process discussed here would ideally have a learning element clearly incorporated. As a starting point, each element of the review should reflect on the previous review cycle before finalizing the next review cycle. Beyond this, certain elements can likely be adjusted and enhanced based on experience with other elements. The first multilateral review under Article 13, for example, can inform the design of the first Global Stocktake. Some elements may be able to draw on experience from the current work on enhancing pre-2020 ambition under Workstream 2 of the Durban Platform.

Finally, a point about non-state actors. One of the innovative aspects of the Paris Conference was its engagement of non-state actors, including sub-national governments, the private sector and non-governmental organizations. It is more clear than ever that the success of Paris will depend significantly on the engagement of non-state actors. While Parties will likely continue to play the predominant role in engaging non-state actors, it is clear that the UN climate regime is evolving to reach out more directly. One of many on-going issues in this regard will be the role of non-state actors in the review of Party’s efforts. However, it may also be useful to consider the role of commitments made by non-state actors in the review cycles under Articles 13-15, whether formally or informally. Will there be space, for example, to consider the commitments made and progress on those commitments by subnational governments in the review of a Party’s efforts? Will there be ways to ensure information about the efforts of non-state actors achieves a certain level of reliability, accuracy and comparability?

 

Conclusion

Much important work lies ahead for negotiators with respect to the reporting, review and compliance elements of the Paris Agreement. The basic building blocks are in place, and there is considerable experience that negotiators will be able to draw on from existing and previous review and compliance processes under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. The Paris Agreement, however, is a new legal instrument with important new features that require careful consideration in the design of effective reporting, review and compliance procedures in support of ambitious action to address climate change by all Parties.

 

Meinhard Doelle,

Director, Marine & Environmental Law Institute

To download some of my publications on related topics, including a recent article on the Paris Climate Agreement, see http://ssrn.com/author=715387.  

 

 

The December 2015 Paris climate negotiations attracted over 150 heads of state, 20,000 government officials, 9,000 observers and almost 4,000 members of the media. Governments and civil society alike have hailed the agreement as a major breakthrough in the global effort to avoid catastrophic climate change. Among the key outcomes from Paris are the following:

• A collective goal of keeping global average temperature increases well below 2 degrees, and to strive to limit increases to 1.5 degrees.
• Agreement that all countries need to act, and that developed countries need to continue to lead through unilateral commitments that need to become more ambitious every five years
• Recognition that by the second half of the century, humans collectively cannot emit any more greenhouse gases (GHG) than we take out of the atmosphere (referred to as GHG neutrality)

For the most developed countries, including Canada, this means we have about 25 to 35 years to become GHG neutral. Opportunities to extract GHG from the atmosphere are currently limited, uncertain, and expensive. Comparatively, many opportunities to reduce GHG emissions are already cost effective, and based on proven technologies. On both fronts, the Paris Agreement signals a new era of economic opportunities that will pre-occupy the global community for the next few decades. Canada will be challenged to transition its energy, transportation and building infrastructure to prepare for GHG neutrality, and to transition its economy toward industries that are contributing to the transition, and that will thrive in a GHG neutral world.

Over the past 10 years, Nova Scotia has taken important steps to prepare for this future. While the federal government has been largely absent from effective climate policy until very recently, Nova Scotia, along with some other provinces, has quietly taken important steps to reduce its GHG emissions, particularly in the electricity sector.  This sector has been, and continues to be among the “low hanging fruit” for Nova Scotia in its efforts to reduce GHG emissions. Nova Scotia was the first province to introduce legally binding limits on GHG emissions from electricity production. Our 40% renewable energy target is leading the country. Our approach to energy efficiency through an independent agency has served as an example to other jurisdictions, as is Nova Scotia’s effort under the Environmental Goals and Sustainable Prosperity Act to integrate environmental protection and economic prosperity. All these initiatives will require ongoing commitment and adjustment to ensure they continue to contribute to the transition to GHG neutrality, but they are important elements for NS to build on, and they put NS in a good position to benefit economically from this transition.

The key for us is to recognise that the era of free GHG emissions is over, and that those who cannot eliminate their GHG emissions will have to pay an ever increasing price for those emissions, threatening the economic viability of industries that cannot become GHG neutral, and offering new opportunities for business that can thrive in a GHG emission neutral world. Smart governments and businesses in Nova Scotia will recognise this new reality. An important step will be to avoid investments that will become stranded assets in a GHG neutral world, such as:

• Buildings that use more energy than necessary, when relatively modest additional up front investments can already approach GHG neutrality in the operation of some new buildings
• Subdivisions that are inaccessible to public transportation, making their future viability dependent on solving the private transport challenge
• Subdivisions and buildings that are not designed to be able to take full advantage of renewable energies, such as passive and active solar, and geothermal energy, reducing options for homeowners to reach GHG neutrality in the future.
• Infrastructure that is significantly dependent on fossil fuels.

It will be critical for Nova Scotia to go beyond the regulation of emissions to encourage economic development that is linked to the global transition to GHG neutrality. Nova Scotia will need to reduce its economic dependence on parts of our economy that are not likely to thrive in a GHG neutral world. We would do well to support and encourage carbon pricing as a way to help fund the transition to GHG neutrality, and to reduce other taxes, such as income and small business taxes, so that we can grow the industries and businesses that will be part of the solution.

It will be important for Nova Scotia to approach the upcoming federal provincial negotiations on climate change with a stated desire to continue to lead and do more, though conditional federal support with the transition to GHG neutrality. This seems the best recipe for getting federal help to strengthen our economy through this transition to a GHG neutral world. If we don’t, we risk being drowned out by bigger provinces and we stand to lose out with an increasingly antiquated economy that will be bogged down by the rising cost of our GHG emissions.

The message to Nova Scotian businesses is clear, minimize the risk to future viability that GHG emissions represent, and pursue economic opportunities associated with the transition to GHG neutrality. Energy efficiency will continue to be a critical immediate step, as will be the management of energy needs in line with the availability of some renewable sources, such as wind, solar, and tidal energy. Avoidance of stranded assets, and full recognition of the inevitability of the transition and its timeframe of 25 to 35 years in business planning will also be key.

Businesses will need help from all levels of government, through predictable regulations and incentives that reward those that are leading this transition. Nova Scotia in particular needs to take steps to diversity its economy to make it less dependent on sectors that will not thrive through this transition. We need to look for opportunities to export GHG neutrality solutions, including the export of energy, and knowledge gained in key sectors, such as agriculture, buildings, and transportation. We need to look for ways to make NS an attractive place for the industries of the future.

So where are the opportunities for Nova Scotia? Answering this question will require the engagement of experts from a broad range of disciples including economics, community development, natural and social sciences, engineering, management and law. It also requires the engagement of interested citizens, stakeholders, and aboriginal communities, as there will be many possible paths to chose from along the way. Anyone supportive of the goal should have a say in how we get there, but we cannot waste any more time on those who choose to ignore the challenges and opportunities ahead. Nova Scotia’s entrepreneurs will be key, as they will be the ones to find the opportunities in this transition.

I do think that it is important for us to think beyond our own province, to work in collaboration with other jurisdictions and to pursue economic opportunities to help those beyond our borders become GHG neutral. What is clear is that there are a number of sectors of our economy that offer particular challenges and opportunities. Among these are agriculture, buildings, natural resources, renewable energy production, energy storage, and the potential integration of the transportation sector into the electricity system.

 

Meinhard Doelle,

Director, Marine & Environmental Law Institute

To download some of my publications on related topics, including a recent article on the Paris Climate Agreement, see http://ssrn.com/author=715387.  

 

Introduction

For those who have not followed the Paris climate negotiations closely, you may be forgiven for being surprised that the Paris Agreement is being hailed as a success. You will likely be concerned to learn that it accepts inadequate targets and financial commitments from many Parties.  These commitments collectively get the world to about a 3 degree increase in global average temperature, even if fully implemented. What’s more, you may be surprised to learn that these inadequate national commitments are not formally part of the legally binding agreement, and that the compliance system is limited to facilitation.

As I will explore in more detail in this post, the short answer to these concerns is that top down binding commitments and strong enforcement have not been seriously considered in the negotiations for some time. They were never on the table in Paris. Such expectations, while not unreasonable, are based on an approach to global cooperation on climate change that the Kyoto Protocol had shown to be ineffective for practical political reasons and that had therefore long been abandoned by most negotiators.

For those who have followed the Paris climate negotiations more closely, there will likely be different disappointments. For some, the inexplicable relegation of gender equity, human rights, intergenerational equity, and climate justice to the preamble of the Paris Agreement will taint the outcome. For others, it will be the exclusion of liability and compensation for loss and damage, or the failure to include a robust top down element to the 5-year stock taking cycles. Other disappointments include the failure to address international shipping and aviation, and the inability of the Parties to agree to a peak year and a decarbonisation year in line with the 1.5 or even 2 degree temperature goals.

My conclusion is that the Paris Climate Agreement is nevertheless a historic breakthrough in the evolution of the UN climate regime. While much work remains, and there are clear shortcomings, the Paris Agreement seems to provide a strong foundation for mobilizing countries around the world to transition to a low emissions development path and to 100% renewable energy. The Paris Agreement insures sufficient nation state control over their own commitments to keep nations engaged. It provides significant, if inadequate assistance for developing countries, adequate transparency, and regular stock taking and review.

These elements, in combination with an ambitious set of long-term goals, do offer a recipe for success. Importantly, the agreement makes it clear that current mitigation and financial commitments represent the floor, not the ceiling of efforts required, so there is every expectation that each 5 year stock staking exercise will pressure parties to increase their ambition toward a collective effort sufficient to meet the long-term goals set out in the agreement.

Assessment of the Paris Agreement

With respect to the negotiating process itself, it is clear that the French presidency learned from past failures such as the Copenhagen COP in 2009. It resisted, throughout the two week marathon, the temptation to shift from an open negotiating approach that included all Parties to one that focused on negotiating blocs and Parties considered to be key to a successful outcome. It did so by using the plenary to identify areas of contention, and by encouraging informal negotiating groups to self identify to seek common ground. It also ensured every party had the opportunity to review each successive version of the text, and to submit its views directly to the presidency. In the end, it was remarkable given the substance of the agreement, that Nicaragua stood alone in refusing to endorse the text.

If there was a shortcoming in the process, it was that negotiations were less accessible to civil society than some other climate negotiations. While last minute negotiations clearly have to be held in private to be successful, the French presidency closed negotiating sessions to observers much earlier in the process than usual. The result was perhaps unnecessary speculation about who was responsible for the removal of gender and human rights language in the purpose section, and for the weakening of long-term ambition language. It also meant it was more difficult for civil society to play its usual role of holding obstructing delegations to account for their role in the negotiations. It may have made agreement easier, but likely did not contribute to a stronger outcome.

Agreement to include the desire to keep global average temperature increases below 1.5 degrees was perhaps the biggest surprise and accomplishment of the Paris negotiations. Small island developing states had been pushing for a 1.5 degree long term ambition goal since before Copenhagen, arguing that anything more would threaten their existence. Until Paris, these efforts were largely ignored by the major negotiating blocks and seemed to have little hope of success. Nevertheless, in Paris, Parties agreed to include the 1.5 goal as part of the long term ambition text, even if it is framed in aspirational language compared to a more clear commitment to keep temperature increases well below 2 degrees. Arguably, 1.5 degrees has now become the ultimate standard against which the success of collective mitigation efforts will be measured. The long term ambition goal provides an important foundation for each country’s future nationally determined contributions, their justification on equity grounds, and the 5-year (stock taking) review cycles. Over time, the 1.5 degree goal can be expected to shape discussions on other elements of the long term ambition text, such as timeframes for the global peak of emissions and for reaching GHG neutrality.

One of the more difficult issues for negotiators in Paris was how to address the inadequacy of mitigation commitments in light of the long term goal.  The mitigation gap was separated in the negotiations into two time period, pre-2020, and post 2020.  The year 2020 is key as it is the date the Paris Agreement is due to come into force. The main challenge for pre-2020 ambition was that inadequate interim arrangements for the period up to 2020 had been put into place gradually over the past 5 years largely based on pledges resulting from the Copenhagen Accord and the Doha Amendments to the Kyoto Protocol.  The focus of the negotiations had, for some time, been on the post 2020 regime. The COP decision in Paris nevertheless make an effort to address the pre 2020 ambition gap through general language to encourage parties to continue their efforts to bridge the gap, through a number of processes designed to encourage increased ambition, and through the appointment of two high level champions to lead the effort to bridge the pre-2020 ambition gap.

The Paris Agreement also explicitly recognizes the post 2020 ambition gap. The mitigation gap is quantified to be upward of 15 gigatonnes by 2030. To bridge this gap, Parties’ nationally determined contributions are to be reviewed every 5 years through stock taking exercises starting in 2018. Consistent with the commitment to bottom up contributions, there is no top down mechanism for allocating responsibility to fill the emissions gap among parties. Rather, parties will be asked, through the stock taking process, to reflect on scientific advice provided by the IPCC (including a 2018 special report on 1.5 degrees pathways), national circumstances, and unspecified equity considerations, to review, revise and justify their contribution to the global effort.

Finance was predicted to be one of the possible deal breakers of the climate talks. A key issue was the adequacy and status of the previous commitment to mobilize funding of USD 100 billion a year by 2020.  Other areas of disagreement included sources of funding, the split between public and private funding, and the allocation of funding, particularly among mitigation, adaptation and loss & damage. Another battleground was over the need for predictable scaled up funding before 2020.

In the end, the main surprise with respect to finance was how little progress was needed to in order to enable an overall agreement in Paris. The floor of 100 billion was confirmed, as was the need to consider a ramping up after 2025, but few other details are provided in the agreement. The collective commitment applies only to developed countries, with any contribution from developing countries provided outside the collective commitment on a voluntary basis. Not much progress was made with respect to sources of funding, and no concrete commitments were made for pre-2020 funding.

Agreement was reached on transparency and review of financial support and its use through the global stocktaking process to be carried out every 5 years. The Paris Agreement provides general support for funding for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD), and calls for the phase out of international support for fossil fuel projects. References in earlier drafts to the phase out of domestic fossil fuel subsidies did not survive the final round of negotiations.

The Paris Agreement contains few surprises with respect to adaptation. It does recognize, for the first time, a global goal of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change. It also articulates the link between the adequacy of mitigation and the adaptation needs of developing countries, and provides for balance between mitigation and adaptation funding. Otherwise, the agreement largely continues with previous efforts to support adaptation efforts in developing countries at a regional, national and subnational level. Notably, the agreement recognizes the need for adaptation efforts to be gender sensitive.

Loss & damage lived up to its promise to be among the issues that would plague negotiators to the very end. The issue had only recently made its way onto the agenda of the UN climate regime, and only after persistent efforts by small island developing states since 2010. In Warsaw in 2013, a loss & damage mechanism was set up under adaptation, and with a narrow investigative mandate that excluded financial support. In Paris, small island states and other like minded Parties were pushing for loss & damage to be formally recognized as a stand along issue with a broader mandate. A number of developed countries, including the US, were trying to keep loss & damage out of the agreement all together, or at least keep it under adaptation with the narrow mandate established in Warsaw. The compromise outcome was a stand-alone article for loss & damage in the Paris Agreement with a somewhat broader mandate, but with an explicit exclusion of compensation and liability for loss & damage. This exclusion is not in the legally binding agreement, so it could be altered in the future through a COP decision.

The main issue with respect to transparency and compliance was differentiation. Many developed countries were pushing for the same transparency and compliance rules for all parties, whereas key developing countries, such as India and China, were pushing for clear differentiation, with strong transparency and compliance for developed countries, and largely self-monitoring for developing countries. The end result was largely the same rules for everyone, but with some minor differentiation, mainly through a commitment to flexibility and support for developing countries. The effectiveness of the transparency provisions will be difficult to assess fully until detailed guidance is developed, but they look promising. On compliance, parties agreed to a facilitation approach for both developed and developing countries.

Concluding Thoughts

The key elements of the Paris Agreement include the nationally determined contributions, significant funding for developing countries, 5 year stock taking and review cycles, transparency, a facilitative approach to compliance, all measured against a strong long term ambition goal that confirms the need for developed countries to lead based on capacity and responsibility and preambular language that includes gender equity, human rights and intergenerational equity.

The message to developed countries is clear. While there are no legally binding emission reduction commitments in the Paris Agreement, developed countries are now under increased scrutiny, and will face growing pressure to demonstrate that they are making an equitable contribution to the global mitigation effort and the long term goal they have endorsed.

Canada is well behind European countries and Japan, and has more recently also fallen behind the United States. In a context of a global commitment to decarbonize, there are environmental and economic imperatives to catching up and assuming the leadership role developed countries have the responsibility and capacity to take.

From a Nova Scotia perspective, the good news is that we have been quietly leading on this issue within Canada for some time. What we have not done is to embrace climate leadership as an economic strategy, and to use our own successes to support national leadership toward reaching the goal of GHG neutrality as soon as possible.

Key areas of focus for Nova Scotia will be transportation, energy, and the building sector. A key first step will be to avoid any significant capital investments in these sectors that will not be part of a GHG emission neutral world. This includes energy infrastructure and buildings in particular, as both will now clearly become stranded assets in the foreseeable future. This needs to be followed with a new economic strategy in light of the new reality just formally recognized in Paris.

 

Meinhard Doelle,

Director, Marine & Environmental Law Institute

To download some of my publications on the UN Climate Regime, see http://ssrn.com/author=715387.  

Another round of climate negotiations in preparations for the Paris Conference of the Parties this December is in the books. Some 190 Parties to the UNFCCC met from June 1 to 11 in Bonn to try to simplify a 90 page negotiating text to a more manageable size with clear options for Ministers to resolve before or at Paris.

The most tangible outcome of 10 days of meetings was a 5 page reduction in the negotiating text, so it is not surprising that many observers have reacted with disappointment to these negotiations. With two negotiating sessions left before Paris, and less than six months, time is clearly running out.

Of course, it would be unfair to measure progress in Bonn solely based on changes to the number of pages of the negotiating text.  The ongoing dialogue on a range of issues from mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, finance, capacity building, transparency, accountability, and legal form can only help to inform upcoming negotiating sessions.

Most important, perhaps, is whether countries demonstrated a genuine effort and notable progress in finding common ground on the key issues that have divided them for so long.  Among these are the adequacy of individual mitigation and finance commitments, the differentiation of  commitments in form and substance among Parties with very different capacity, potential and responsibility, and the legal form of the agreement.  While there were few signs of progress in these areas, the real test will be future negotiating sessions in the coming months.

The following are among the key outstanding process and legal form issues yet to be resolved:

• Will the Paris agreement take the form of a Protocol under the UNFCCC, amendments to the UNFCCC, some other legal agreement under the UNFCCC, the form of non-binding decisions of the Conference of the Parties, or some combination?
• Assuming that there will be a legal agreement in combination with COP decisions, what parts of the current negotiating text will be included in the legal agreement, and what parts will be moved into subordinate (COP) decisions?
• What issues currently included in the negotiating text will be decided in Paris, what issues will be resolved later through COP decisions in future years?
• How will existing institutions set up through COP decisions since 2009, including the Green Climate Fund, the Technology Mechanism, and the Loss and Damage Mechanism, be brought into the new regime?
• Will any of the institutions under the Kyoto Protocol be brought into the new regime, most notably the CDM?
• Where and how will Parties’ commitments in INDCs be reflected in the new agreement?

Key substantive issues

• Will individual commitments expressed in INDCs filed over the coming months come reasonably close to what science and equity demand?  Will they put pressure on countries who have filed inadequate INDCs to revise their commitments before or after Paris?
• Will Parties agree to a meaningful combination of commitment cycles and review of performance and adequacy to offer hope for individual commitments to fill the ambition gap over time?
• Will the ongoing discussion on the pre-2020 ambition gap result in effective measures to reduce the gap and learn from this experience to set in motion an effective process to ensure post-2020 ambition comes into line with scientific predictions and a measure of equity.
• Will the differentiation among Parties extend beyond the nature and ambition of the individual commitments made, and extend to differentiation on issues such as reporting, review, transparency, accountability, and compliance?
• Will issues around the sources and scale of funding along with how it is to be allocated and spent be resolved in Paris?

With this long (partial) list of outstanding issues, what are some key measures of success in Paris?  It seems inevitable that some issues will not be resolved.  It is important to recall that when the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 1997, it took 4 more years to negotiate the rules of implementation.  The regime to be negotiated in Paris is due to come into force in 2020, so while there is time to work out some rules of implementation, it cannot take more than a year or two if Parties are to have sufficient time to implement the agreement. While there are many ways to measure success in Paris, I would suggest the following are among the key elements:

• Will the agreement be universally endorsed, or will there be significant dissent or disapproval, either formally as in Copenhagen, or informally?
• Do Parties come out of Paris committed to meeting their INDCs and to increase their ambition over time
• Does the Paris agreement provide adequate motivation and effective mechanisms for individual and collective increases of ambition over time?  For example, as Parties, subnational governments, or non-state actors want to make commitments to help increase ambition, will the UN climate regime offer effective mechanisms to recognize and support those efforts?

It is trite to say that it is crunch time in the UN climate negotiations, as the regime has been in crises now for almost a decade.  The upcoming negotiating sessions in Bonn in September and October will be critical, as will the effort by the UNFCCC secretariat and co-chairs of the key negotiating group (called the ADP) to streamline and organize the currently unwieldy negotiating text by the middle of July.

For more information about the state of the negotiations, see the UNFCCC website at:  unfccc.int, and the Earth Negotiations Bulletin summary of the June 1-11 Bonn climate negotiations at: http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12638e.html.

To download some of my publications on climate change law & policy, see http://ssrn.com/author=715387.  

 

Meinhard Doelle,

Director, Marine & Environmental Law Institute

 

2015 marks 25 years of UN climate negotiations. As the almost 200 Parties to the UNFCCC are starting to file their “individually determined contributions” to the post 2020 climate regime to be negotiated in Paris at the end of this year, it is already becoming clear that after 25 years of effort, we will not end the year 2015 with a binding, adequate and equitable allocation of responsibilities, benefits, risks, and uncertainties to manage the human impact on the global climate system. It seems clear that key parties to the negotiations continue to view the economic and political stakes as too high to accept their share of responsibility in the context of a binding global agreement. We can debate whether these assessments are fair, and whether they even best serve the self-interest of the countries involved, but it is difficult to escape the conclusion that we will fall short, yet again, in 2015.

How did we get here, and what are the options going forward?

The UN climate regime has been built on the largely successful model of the Vienna Convention on Ozone Depleting Substances and its Montreal Protocol. The expectation had been that eventually, close to 200 UN member states would reach a consensus agreement on how to allocate the responsibilities, benefits, risks and uncertainties of climate mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology access, capacity building and loss and damage in a manner that is equitable, both intra, and inter-generationally. After modest initial progress in the form of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, the negotiations for the past 15 years have been largely marked by failure, delay and retreat, all the while focusing on the UN climate regime as the place to solve the growing climate crisis. Some countries, at times, have taken steps outside the UN process, however, these steps have been modest, and they have either been an effort to undermine the UN process (such as the Asia-Pacific Partnership or the Major Economies Forum), or they appear to have been short terms efforts motivated by a desire to directly influence the UN negotiations (such as various US and EU efforts to reach out to key developing countries).

In recent years, the UN climate negotiations have become an almost annual ritual of expectations based on science running up against political realities. Inevitably, governments change in key countries resulting in new hope that a country that has been particularly difficult will become a more constructive player in the negotiations (such as elections in the US and Australia in the previous decade), coupled with new despair that a country that has been a constructive player in the past is becoming a barrier to progress as a result of changes in domestic politics or other circumstances (such as elections in Canada and Australia, and the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan in the current decade). Since the Conference of the Parties in 2005 in Montreal, when the current round of negotiations for a comprehensive global regime was first launched, we have seen political shifts that offered hope in the United States, Japan, Australia, and India among others. Over that same time period, we have seen shifts that have created new barriers to the negotiations in Japan, Canada, and Australia to name a few. In short, the political realities have shifted at time, but the end result, inevitably, has been that a number of key countries are politically unwilling or unable to make a binding commitment to an equitable share of responsibility to enable an adequate global agreement on climate change.

After 25 years of growing futility, it is time to reflect on whether this process is still the best way to make progress on the climate change challenge. With time running out to avoid the worst impacts on climate change through an orderly transition of economies and societies in over 190 countries, it may be time to re-consider putting all our hopes in the UN climate negotiations. Perhaps it is time that we look at the UN climate negotiations as just one tool to solve the climate crisis, rather than continue to think of it as the primary mechanism, and perhaps inadvertently push other mechanisms to the sidelines in the process.

The focus on the UN climate regime has been understandable. Not only was it based on the success from the Ozone regime, but it remains clear that climate change cannot be controlled without global cooperation. This means that the UN climate regime has to be part of the solution to the climate challenge. The mistake, perhaps, has been to look to the UN climate regime almost to the exclusion of other mechanisms and approaches, and to expect the UN climate regime to serve as the primary mechanism to overcome the political and economic barriers to progress. Perhaps the UN climate regime has a more modest but effective role as a barometer of where we are and what remains to be done, rather than to view it as the form for resolving the barriers to progress.

Rather than continuing to seek binding commitments from parties that are adequate but that some countries inevitably will not accept and others will not implement, the primary role of the UN climate regime might be to track and shed light on the adequacy and equity of global and individual progress toward the goal of keeping global temperatures below 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels (as well as the adequacy of the 2 degree goal). The UN climate regime could regularly review both the collective voluntary commitments made and the actual progress made by each country toward their voluntary commitment. Through this review process, principles of equity and adequacy would be developed and refined over time.

Assuming the UN climate regime shifts focus to serving as a repository of voluntary commitments and as the forum for assessing and debating adequacy and equity, how would political and economic barriers to progress be overcome? Regional and bilateral efforts offer perhaps the greatest hope of overcoming these barriers as they would not be hampered by the need for global consensus, and would encourage “coalitions of the willing” in key areas. The EU, for example, has significant potential to lead regionally, and to reach out to key developing countries to overcome key barriers to global progress. Similarly, US efforts to engage with China and India could play a critical role in overcoming barriers in key participating countries. Such bilateral agreements between the US and emerging economies, for example, can both convince the US to act, and unlock motivation in emerging economies to choose a different development path, something the UN climate negotiations have not been able to secure in 25 years.

In the Kyoto negotiations, parties tried but failed to reach agreement on principles of fairness (a debate between capacity and historical responsibility that was arguably doomed to failure over concerns about the implications for potential future liability) and decided to jump straight to negotiating binding commitments for developed countries. This approach has failed because the short-term political and economic stakes have proven to be too high in some countries to reach a global consensus on a full package, meaning a package that is adequate, equitable, and binding.

The main choices for Paris, based on the history of the negotiations, the domestic situation in key countries, and the individually determined contributions (INDCs) that are now coming in, would seem to be the following:

• a binding agreement that does not include the US, and likely also not Russia, Canada, Japan, and likely some other developed countries, with resulting uncertainly about the willingness of other parties to make adequate commitments
• a non-binding agreement that includes all parties with firm commitments that are inadequate, but that are likely to be implemented
• a non-binding agreement that includes all parties with voluntary commitments that are adequate but that are not likely to be implemented
• a non-binding agreement with voluntary commitments that are acknowledged to be inadequate, and that focuses on full transparency and on the responsibility of the UN climate regime on tracking adequacy and equity of commitment, and to seek agreement on principles of equity and adequacy, but relinquishes the UN climate regime’s responsibility to turn principles of adequacy and equity into a distribution of commitments to individual parties.

So here are the questions I am left to ponder this year as I watch the negotiations unfold. How many more years of paralysis can we afford? Given this history and state of the negotiations, would an abandonment of binding targets offer the best hope for enabling the UN climate regime to play a meaningful role going forward? Should the UN climate regime continue on its current track, or should it focus on tracking and assessing progress toward addressing climate change, rather than seeking consensus on the actual distribution of responsibilities? Are there other solutions to the impasse?  I come to ask these questions reluctantly, having long been an advocate for a binding UN Agreement as the best hope for addressing the climate crisis.

For further readings on my reflections on the failure of the climate negotiations in recent years, see:

http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1535669

http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2389851

To download any of my publications on the UN Climate Regime, see http://ssrn.com/author=715387.  

 

Meinhard Doelle,

Director, Marine & Environmental Law Institute

On the surface, the Lima decisions on loss and damage may seem uncontroversial. The COP adopted the interim executive committee’s 2 year workplan and took steps to ensure the transition to a properly constituted executive committee. The COP reached agreement on the composition of the executive committee and some basic elements of its operation, such as consensus based decision making, minimum number of meetings per year, annual reporting to the COP, and transparency of its work through public access to meetings and decisions. This work is recognized in the preamble of the Lima Call For Climate Action, which makes specific reference to the Warsaw Mechanism and acknowledges the progress that has been made toward its implementation.

A closer looks, however, suggests there is good reason to worry about the future of loss and damage in the 2015 climate agreement. Article 2 of the Lima Call For Climate Action decides that the 2015 agreement shall address mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity-building, and transparency of action and support in “a balanced manner”. It makes no reference to loss and damage. The decision does leave open the possibility of including other items, but it is striking that loss and damage is not included in the list of issues to be addressed in a “balanced manner”.

The draft negotiating text attached as an Annex to the Lima Call for Climate Action is not the final negotiating text for the Paris agreement. The Lima Call for Climate Action explicitly left open the possibility of Parties adding to or amending the current negotiating text leading up to Paris. The current text offers little detail on the future of loss and damage, but it does includes a range of basic options on loss and damage, ranging from no reference to the issue in the Paris agreement to full recognition and possible enhancement of the Warsaw Mechanism to address loss and damage including through compensation. In short, the state of the Warsaw Mechanism in the current negotiations toward the post 2020 climate regime is very much uncertain in light of the COP decisions in Lima. One possible scenario clearly favoured by many developed countries is a mechanism that has no powers beyond investigating the issues identified in its current two-year workplan. At the other end of the spectrum would be the formal inclusion in the Paris agreement of a stand-alone mechanism on loss and damage that includes provision for compensation for loss and damage. It seems clear that many developed countries see the loss and damage mechanism as a threat rather than as an important part of the solution, and are, unfortunately, aggressively fighting against the inclusion of it as a separate pillar in the Paris agreement.

To download my publications on the topic of loss and damage, see http://ssrn.com/author=715387.  

 

Meinhard Doelle,

Director, Marine & Environmental Law Institute

 

There is nothing like leaving Canada to regain some hope that the world may still be able to avoid the worst impacts on climate change.  I spent the past 10 days following the climate negotiations in Bonn, and have been discussing the state of play with negotiators and researchers from around the world, while attending a number of side events that have explored what is being done and what could be done to tackle climate change.  My overall reaction to my time in Bonn is that we sometimes forget in Canada how much is being done about this issue elsewhere, and how seriously the issue is taken in many countries around the world.  The following are a few more specific reflections on the past week.

 

Negotiation Update

First, a brief update on the outcome of the negotiations.  As has become the norm in this negotiation process, the June session in Bonn covered a broad range of issues, including mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, finance, technology, capacity building, transparency, compliance and legal form. In my assessment, however, three issues dominated this round of the negotiations:

1. The inadequacy of developed country mitigation commitment between now and 2020,
2. The process for agreeing to adequate and fair mitigation efforts for all countries starting in 2020, and
3. The need to capitalize and operationalize the UN climate regimes main funding mechanism, the Green Climate Fund (GCF).

• Pre-2020 Ambition

I explored the first issue in my previous post, but here is the key point. The focus of the current negotiations is an agreement to be finalized in 2015 and to come into force in 2020.  This timeline was adopted after the failed negotiations in Copenhagen, as it became clear that it would take time to pick up the pieces.  At the same time, negotiators realized that the climate does not wait for negotiators, so efforts are ongoing to encourage all developed and developing countries to commit to additional efforts to reduce their emissions before 2020.  Negotiations on how to achieve this are going 0n in parallel with the negotiations for the new post 2020 agreement, and are taking place under the name of “pre-2020 ambition”.  Until recently, these negotiations had been marked largely by backtracking and inadequate domestic efforts from 4 key developed countries, Canada, Australia, Japan, and the United States.  As explored in my previous post, the recent announcement of the US is starting to change this and putting pressure on the remaining three countries.

• Post-2020 Commitments

The second key issue in the negotiations has been the post 2020 commitments. Progress on pre-2020 ambition has always been seen as a pre-condition for an adequate agreement on post 2020 mitigation.  This is so, because of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR), enshrined in the UNFCCC.  Developing countries are being asked, for the first time, to make significant mitigation commitments.  Their willingness to do so is conditional on developed countries taking the lead and providing support.  The failure of leadership by some developed countries has allowed a number of developing countries (negotiating under the name of Like Minded Developing Countries or LMDCs and led by China and India) to continue to resist efforts to agree to an effective process to set mitigation targets for all countries for the post 2020 period, but there were signs in Bonn that this will change now that the US is moving forward domestically, particularly if Japan, Canada and Australia follow the lead of the US and raised their pre-2020 ambition.

Key issues currently being negotiated for the post 2020 mitigation efforts include the following:

• When will countries announce their “intended nationally determined commitments” (INDCs)?
• Will INDCs be limited to mitigation or will they include other issues, such as adaptation and finance?
• What information should countries include when they report on their INDCs?
• Will the adequacy of the INDCs be reviewed before the 2015 conference in Paris?
• What (if any) criteria will be applied to determine whether a countries INDCs are adequate?
• What happens if a country’s INDC is considered by others to be inadequate?
• What happens if all the individual commitments do not add up to an adequate overall efforts, i.e. one that keeps global average temperature increase to below 2 degrees?

A particularly encouraging announcement was that Germany and the UK are pushing for a 50% target below 1990 levels for the EU for 2030.  It seems clear at this point that these countries are seeing and are already benefitting from the economic opportunities of leading the solution to climate change.  China is similarly showing signs of seeing this potential by pushing domestic mitigation efforts.  It is unfortunate, that we in Canada continue to give up on this huge opportunity just to protect industries for a few more years that are not part of the solution.   What will the long term economic price be for Canada?

• Capitalization of the Green Climate Fund

The third key issue in the Bonn negotiations was finance, and particularly the capitalization of the Green Climate Fund (GCF).  This fund has been established to facilitate the financial support for developing countries in a range of areas, including mitigation, adaptation, technology and capacity building.  It is ready to become operational, but remains an empty shell, in spite of previous commitments from developed countries to ramp up funding to $100 billion US by 2020.  It is critical for the GCF to gain much needed experience in overseeing the funding process before it takes responsibility for the full scale of funding in 2020.  The capitalization of the GCF is also an important step in building trust between developed and developing countries.

 

Innovative Ideas

Of course, the negotiations are also an opportunity to explore longer term issues and to think beyond the immediate issues that tend to pre-occupy negotiators. The following are some to the many fascinating ideas circulating at the negotiations and side events that caught my attention.

• Carbon Majors Loss & Damage Liability

In a discussion paper released by Climate Justice and the Heinrich Boll Foundation, we have, for the first time in the climate context, a concrete proposal to link liability for loss and damage directly to the companies who are responsible for the largest share of emissions to date.  The idea is based on similar mechanisms with respect to liability associated with major oil pollution damage from oil tankers.  The approach, if designed well, can serve two purposes.  It can ensure that the cost of climate related loss and damage is properly internalized into the price of products and services that contribute to the problem.  In addition, it can start to address the problem that the countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change tend to lack the capacity to respond to the impacts, and tend to have contributed little to the problem.

Related Links:

https://www.boell.de/en/publications

http://www.dw.de/fossil-fuel-industry-should-pay-for-climate-damage/a-17702476

 

• Push for 100% Renewable Energy & Fossil Fuel Phase-out by 205o

A range of organizations are starting to consider the feasibility of phasing out fossil fuels by 2050, through a combination of efforts including energy efficiency and 100% renewable energy.  Organizations such as Chatam House, Ecofys, the Climate Action Network, IRENA, REN, among many others presented their ideas on this issue at side events in Bonn.  Over 60 countries already support this goal, and communities around the world, from small to large, have committed to this goal, some have already achieved it.  One key message is that these goals are achievable with current technologies, though they clearly will benefit from further innovation. The other is that such a transition is affordable, as long as jurisdictions that depend heavily on the production of fossil fuels start to transition their economic dependence on this sector. Whether 2050 is the appropriate timeframe for the phase out of energy from fossil fuels remains to be seen, but there is clearly momentum toward this as a focus of the effort to mitigate climate change.  Among the policy tools being proposed to facilitate this transition is a globally supported Feed-in Tariff.

Related Links:

http://www.irena.org/Publications/index.aspx?mnu=cat&PriMenuID=36&CatID=141

http://www.ecofys.com/en/publications/, http://www.whatnext.org/

 

• Integrating of Mitigation, Adaptation and Sustainable Development

There seems to be a growing recognition that the separation between climate mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development, while understandable at the early stages of the UN climate regime, is artificial, and risks facilitating and perhaps even encouraging actions in any one of these areas that undermine the other two.  A number of side events explored this issue.  Some focused on green growth efforts, others on the relationship between low emissions development strategies and mitigation actions in developing countries.  Others explored the connection between mitigation and adaptation, pointing out that adaptation efforts need to be conscious of the need to reduce and eliminate the reliance on fossil fuels, and likewise, mitigation efforts need to be climate resilient.

Related Links:

http://ggbp.org/

Home Page 2022

http://www.wri.org/event/leds-global-partnership-%E2%80%93-fostering-collaboration-low-emissions-development

 

To download my publications on the UN Climate Regime, see http://ssrn.com/author=715387.  

 

 

Meinhard Doelle,

Director, Marine & Environmental Law Institute